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ABSTRACT 
Although the Agreement on South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) 
was signed in January 2004, it has not substantially contributed to the 
expansion of regional trade among its contracting states. This article 
shows how a number of bilateral preferential trade agreements (PTAs) 
between SAFTA parties act as formidable stumbling blocks against the 
expansion of intra-SAFTA trade and must be abolished. It critically 
analyzes SAFTA’s constraints, including areas that SAFTA over- and 
under-regulates, that militate against the expansion of intra-SAFTA 
trade. Finally, it advocates that SAFTA must be more ambitious in its 
scope by adding provisions that will help attract foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and build coalitions for World Trade Organization 
(WTO) negotiations. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2004, the member states of the South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation (SAARC)1 agreed to establish a South Asian Free 
Trade Area (SAFTA).2 However, this agreement has not substantially 
contributed to the expansion of regional trade among its contracting 
states. First, this article critically assesses how individual trade 
agreements between two countries, known as bilateral preferential trade 
agreements (PTAs), undermine SAFTA’s trade liberalization initiative. 
Second, it identifies SAFTA’s textual limitations and suggests several 
amendments that would address those limitations. Third, it recommends 
ways for the contracting parties to attract Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) and take up concerted positions in World Trade Organization 
(WTO) negotiations to elicit better results for the region. Fourth, it 
analyzes the prospect of trade proliferation among the member countries 
in trade services. Finally, this article discusses SAFTA’s implications to 
trade between SAFTA members and third parties. 
II. THE BILATERAL PTA QUANDARY BETWEEN SAFTA 
CONTRACTING PARTIES 
Bilateral PTAs create major obstacles to trade proliferation between 
SAFTA contracting parties under the auspices of the SAARC. Like 
SAFTA, these bilateral PTAs are authorized under the Enabling Clause 
of the WTO.3 Though the liberalization schemes of these PTAs are not as 
comprehensive as many of those created by economically advanced 
countries, they do offer certain trade benefits that SAFTA does not. The 
tariff liberalization schemes in many of these bilateral agreements are 
more ambitious than in SAFTA, so there is a tendency for countries to 
trade under bilateral PTAs instead of using SAFTA to increase trade. 
For relatively small countries, the incentive to support SAFTA 
drastically diminishes when they receive preferential access to India’s 
market through a bilateral PTA. Indeed, any business that gains from 
                                                           
1 The current SAARC member states are: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, 
Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. SAARC, http://www.saarc-sec.org (last visited Oct. 26, 2010).  
2 Agreement on South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA), Jan. 6, 2004, art. 2, available at 
http://www.saarc-sec.org/userfiles/saftaagreement.pdf (SAARC) [hereinafter SAFTA]. Afghanistan 
became a party to SAFTA in 2007. Declaration of the Fourteenth SAARC Summit, Apr. 3-4, 2007, ¶ 
2, available at http://www.saarc-sec.org/userfiles/Summit Declarations/14 - New Delhi, 14th 
Summit 3-4 April 2007.pdf. 
3 World Trade Organization Decision, Differential and More Favourable Treatment 
Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, ¶ 1, L/4903 (Nov. 28, 1979), 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/enabling_e.pdf. 
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preferential access under a bilateral PTA to a substantial market in 
another member country is likely to lobby its government against trade 
liberalization under SAFTA. When liberalization occurs under SAFTA, 
competition from producers of other SAFTA contracting parties 
inexorably follows. As such, bilateral PTAs create an incentive for 
businesses that works against trade liberalization under SAFTA. To what 
extent their mercantilist interests constrain SAFTA depends on their 
political clout and lobbying capacities, but as a group they are a 
stumbling force against SAFTA. The fact that some goods featured on 
the concessions list of bilateral PTAs are also featured on the sensitive 
list under SAFTA bolsters the conjecture that their purpose on the 
sensitive list is protectionist.  
Bilateral PTAs provide many benefits to South Asian countries that 
SAFTA currently does not, such as: 1) better market access, 2) faster 
tariff reduction schedules, 3) discrimination benefits, 4) restricted non-
tariff barriers, and 5) more liberal rules of origin. This section examines 
each of these five benefits for the purpose of illustrating the need for 
SAFTA to include similar benefits to attract more support from its 
members. 
A. Bilateral PTAs Offer Better Market Access 
Compared to SAFTA, bilateral PTAs between SAFTA contracting 
parties offer better market access opportunities. This is in part because 
individual countries’ sensitive or negative lists of products in PTAs are 
generally much shorter than the same ones in SAFTA. For example, 
under the Free Trade Agreement between the Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan and the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (Pakistan-
Sri Lanka PTA) Pakistan’s sensitive list of products contains 540 tariff 
lines,4 which is meager compared to its revised sensitive list under 
SAFTA, which contains 1169 tariff lines.5 Under this same PTA, Sri 
Lanka’s sensitive list contains 697 tariff lines,6 whereas its revised list 
under SAFTA contains 1065 tariff lines.7 Similarly, the India-Sri Lanka 
PTA has a shorter sensitive list than SAFTA has. Under the India-Sri 
                                                           
4 Pakistan Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement, Pak.-Sri Lanka, Aug. 1, 2002, SRI LANKA DEP’T 
OF COMMERCE,  available at http://www.doc.gov.lk/web/pakissrilanka_freetrade.php (follow “Duty 
Concessions” hyperlink then under “(Annex A)” follow “Attachment I” hyperlink) [hereinafter 
Pakistan-Sri Lanka PTA].  
5 Revised Sensitive Lists Under SAFTA, SAARC SECRETARIAT, http://www.saarc-
sec.org/main.php?t=2.1.6 (last visited Oct. 28, 2010); Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of 
Commerce, Bangladesh Regional and Bilateral Trade  
http://www.mincom.gov.bd/reg_bil_trade.php (last visited Nov. 28, 2010). 
6 Pakistan-Sri Lanka PTA, supra note 4 (follow “Duty Concessions” hyperlink then under 
“(Annex B)” follow “Attachment I” hyperlink). 
7 Revised Sensitive Lists Under SAFTA, supra note 5. 
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Lanka PTA, India has a sensitive list of 431 tariff lines8 compared to 863 
tariff lines for developing countries and 480 tariff lines for Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs)9 under SAFTA. 
Noticeably, the discriminatory aspect of these two bilateral PTAs is 
not limited to SAFTA’s developing contracting parties but also extends 
to the LDC contracting parties. This ends up benefiting the bilateral PTA 
contracting parties at the expense of SAFTA’s LDC contracting parties. 
Conversely, under SAFTA, contracting parties have undertaken to grant 
special treatment to the LDC contracting parties.10 Under SAFTA, LDC 
contracting parties are also accorded a wider time frame to liberalize 
their tariffs. However, under the Pakistan-Sri Lanka PTA each country 
immediately benefits by providing a shorter sensitive list of products, 
granting each other better market access than they grant their LDC 
counterparts under SAFTA. Similarly, under the India-Sri Lanka PTA, 
India offers Sri Lanka better market access to a developing SAFTA 
contracting party than it offers to LDC contracting parties under SAFTA. 
SAFTA Article 13 plainly provides that its provisions will not apply to 
any preference that the contracting parties have granted or may grant to 
each other or any third parties outside of the SAFTA framework. Hence, 
more favorable treatment to developing contracting parties under these 
bilateral PTAs would not amount to de jure violation of any obligations 
under SAFTA. Nonetheless, these dealings vitiate SAFTA’s fundamental 
principle of special treatment of LDC contracting parties.  
Even when a bilateral PTA between SAFTA contracting parties has 
low trade coverage in terms of number of tariff lines, the products that 
are covered are likely to have considerable negative practical 
implications for other contracting parties. For example, in the India-
Afghanistan PTA, Afghanistan offers India concessions only on eight 
goods and receives reciprocal concessions on thirty-eight goods.11 
However, two of the eight products on which Afghanistan offers 
                                                           
8 Indo Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement, India-Sri Lanka, Dec. 28, 1998, SRI LANKA DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE, http://www.doc.gov.lk/web/indusrilanka_freetrade.php (follow “Duty Concessions” 
hyperlink then under “Annex A” follow “01 Annex D(I)” hyperlink) [hereinafter India-Sri Lanka 
PTA]. 
9 SAARC LDCs include Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, and Nepal. See United 
Nations Least Developed Country List, http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/related/62/ (last visited Oct. 
26, 2010). 
10 SAFTA, supra note 2, art. 11.  
11 Preferential Trade Agreement between the Republic of India and the Transitional Islamic 
State of Afghanistan, India-Afg., Mar. 6, 2003, Annexures A & B, INDIA DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
http://commerce.nic.in/trade/international_ta_indafg.asp [hereinafter India-Afghanistan PTA]. 
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concessions are on Afghanistan’s SAFTA sensitive list of goods.12 Items 
such as apples, caraway seeds, dried apricots, grapes, linseed, sesame 
seeds, shelled walnuts, unshelled walnuts, plums and mulberries, and 
watermelons are items on which India offers concessions to Afghanistan. 
However, all of these goods are on India’s sensitive list for LDCs under 
SAFTA.13  
The divergence in the sensitive list of the India-Afghanistan PTA 
and SAFTA may be explained in one of two ways: either concessions 
were not requested by other contracting parties or they were placed on 
the sensitive list for protectionist purposes. As tariff concessions are 
outcomes of negotiations, it may be that the other SAFTA contracting 
parties do not have any significant export interests in these products in 
the Indian or Afghan markets. Therefore, no demand for concessions 
may have been placed on them by the remaining SAFTA contracting 
parties. However, a PTA’s sensitive list generally denotes the presence of 
a domestic industry and competitive exporters in partner countries. 
Therefore, a more plausible explanation is that these items are placed on 
the sensitive list for the protectionist purpose of restraining imports from 
the remaining contracting parties.  
One can argue that in some cases exclusive concessions in a bilateral 
PTA between two SAFTA contracting parties will not impair other 
SAFTA contracting parties’ trading interests because there may be no 
other SAFTA producers of like goods among SAFTA contracting parties. 
However, when a product subject to preferential treatment in a bilateral 
PTA is placed on SAFTA’s sensitive list of goods this possibility is very 
slim. Because bilateral PTAs have better overall market access than 
SAFTA, bilateral PTAs will continue to impede SAFTA’s 
implementation. 
B. Bilateral PTAs Provide Faster Tariff Reduction Schedules 
Bilateral PTAs cover not only a wider variety of products than those 
under SAFTA, but in some cases they also have a shorter tariff 
liberalization schedule.14 Under SAFTA, tariffs will be reduced to 
between zero and five percent by 2016.15 However, when this is 
compared to the Pakistan-Sri Lanka PTA, the PTA has the advantage. 
                                                           
12 Id. Annexure A (the two products are cement clinkers and white cement); E-mail Attachment 
from Subash C. Sharma, SAARC Econ., Trade, Fin. & Transp. Div., to editor (Oct. 24, 2010, 22:00 
MDT) (on file with publisher). 
13 India-Afghanistan PTA, supra note 12, Annexure B; Revised Sensitive Lists Under SAFTA, 
supra note 5. 
14 A tariff liberalization schedule is the schedule by which tariffs are reduced over time as 
agreed upon by the Contracting Parties. See SAFTA, supra note 2, art. 7. 
15 SAFTA, supra note 2, art. 7(1)(d). 
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Pakistan has eliminated tariffs altogether on 206 tariff lines for imports 
from Sri Lanka and Sri Lanka has eliminated tariffs on 102 tariff lines 
for imports from Pakistan.16 The India-Sri Lanka PTA also has more 
accelerated targets for tariff elimination than SAFTA has. Under their 
PTA, India has offered Sri Lankan producers duty-free access in 4233 
tariff lines and Sri Lanka has offered Indian producers free access in 
4024 tariff lines.17 Shorter lists of sensitive products and shorter tariff 
liberalization schedules offer countries better market access opportunities 
through current bilateral PTAs than those offered through SAFTA.  
C. Bilateral PTAs Create Discrimination Through Reverse 
Market Access 
Not only are tariff reductions and product coverage under SAFTA 
less generous than some bilateral PTAs among contracting parties, but 
PTAs also give extensive benefits in other forms. The India-Maldives 
PTA, for instance, does not provide for any preferential access in terms 
of tariff cuts but does allow the Maldives to import products like river 
sand, eggs, potatoes, and onions that are subject to export bans in India.18 
This appears to be a measure to boost India’s agricultural export to the 
Maldives, but it does not give Indian producers any preference to the 
market of the Maldives. Therefore, it may seem that other SAFTA 
members do not stand to lose economically since they are not ipso facto 
subject to any market-entry barriers in the Maldives. However, the 
Maldives is being given an option of a steady source of needed supplies 
that otherwise would be unavailable to it from India. India aside, every 
member of SAFTA is a net food-importing country.19 Hence, as net food-
importing countries, a firm and steady option for importing these food 
products from India may be welfare enhancing for them, at least in the 
short or medium term until their own domestic agricultural production 
increases to meet local demands. Thus, bilateral PTAs also give 
                                                           
16 Pakistan-Sri Lanka PTA, supra note 4 (follow “Duty Concessions” hyperlink then under 
“(Annex A)” follow “Attachment II” hyperlink, and under “(Annex B)” follow “Attachment II” 
hyperlink).  
17 India-Sri Lanka PTA, supra note 8 (follow “Duty Concessions” hyperlink then under 
“Annex A” follow “02 Annex E” hyperlink and under “Annex B” follow “02 Annex F1” and “03 
Annex FII” hyperlinks).  
18 Trade Agreement Between the Gov’t of the Republic of India and the Gov’t of the Republic 
of Maldives, India-Maldives, art. VIII – IX, Mar. 31, 1981, INDIA DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
http://www.commerce.nic.in/trade/maldives.pdf. 
19 Comm. on Agric., WTO List of Net Food-Importing Developing Countries for the Purposes 
of the Marrakesh Ministerial Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the 
REFORM Programme on Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries, 
G/AG/5/Rev.8 (Mar. 22, 2005). 
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extensive benefits in other forms such as the creation of discrimination 
through reverse market access commitments, which significantly benefit 
some parties. 
D. Bilateral PTAs Restrict Non-tariff Barriers 
Whereas SAFTA does not have a binding provision for eliminating 
or reducing non-tariff barriers, bilateral PTAs have specific provisions in 
place. For example, the India-Nepal PTA provides that, subject to few 
exceptions, all goods of Indian or Nepalese origin are free from any 
quantitative, licensing, or permit restrictions by either of the contracting 
parties.20 This gives Nepalese producers an edge over their competitors 
from other SAFTA contracting parties.  
E.  Bilateral PTAs Provide More Liberal Rules of Origin 
Another difference between a PTA and SAFTA is that the rules of 
origin in bilateral PTAs are more liberal than the rules of origin of 
SAFTA. Under the India-Sri Lanka PTA, a product not wholly produced 
in one of the two countries is eligible for preferential tariff treatment, 
provided that the inputs from third parties or of undetermined origin do 
not exceed sixty-five percent of the final product and that final 
processing occurs in the exporting contracting party’s territory.21 It also 
requires that the final product be in a different tariff line than any of the 
inputs from third parties.22 This change in tariff line requirement in 
SAFTA is identical, but in the case of developing countries SAFTA rules 
of origin permit only sixty percent of third party inputs.23 Therefore, the 
producers of India or Sri Lanka who use third party inputs between sixty 
to sixty-five percent would have to resort to the India-Sri Lanka PTA if 
they want to enjoy the preferential tariff rate. The same scenario would 
apply to trade between Pakistan and Sri Lanka because the Pakistan-Sri 
Lanka PTA rules of origin also allow up to sixty-five percent third party 
inputs and require change in tariff line.24 
Notably, bilateral PTA rule of origin cumulative provisions have 
different standards than SAFTA. The Pakistan-Sri Lanka PTA’s 
cumulative rule of origin provides that the exporting country’s value 
                                                           
20 Revised Indo-Nepal Treaty of Trade, India-Nepal, art. II, Oct. 27, 2009, INDIA DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE, http://www.commerce.nic.in/trade/nepal.pdf [hereinafter India-Nepal PTA]. 
21 India-Sri Lanka PTA, supra note 8, r.7(a) (follow “Rules of Origin Requirements (Annex 
C)” hyperlink). 
22 Id. r.7(a)-(b).  
23 Revised Sensitive Lists Under SAFTA, supra note 5, Annex IV, r.8(a)(ii) (follow “Rules of 
Origin” hyperlink). 
24 Pakistan-Sri Lanka PTA, supra note 4, r.8(a)-(b) (follow “Rules of Origin Requirements 
(Annex C)” hyperlink then “View Full Text”). 
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addition must not be less than twenty-five percent of the final product, 
and that the value addition from the other contracting party be at least ten 
percent. In addition, the change in tariff line rule applies.25 The 
cumulative rule of origin of the India-Sri Lanka PTA has identical rules 
on this point.26 Although SAFTA’s cumulative rules of origin only 
require twenty percent domestic value addition, they have a thirty 
percent value addition requirement from other contracting parties.27 
Hence, producers in India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka who want to benefit 
from a preferential tariff will source inputs under their bilateral PTA, 
rather than SAFTA, since it requires less value addition from other 
countries to meet the threshold. This hurts the trading interests of the 
remaining SAFTA contracting parties.  
III. SAFTA’S STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS 
SAFTA suffers from many areas of over- or under-regulation. Many 
of these structural constraints are impeding the member countries from 
trading with each other. These include: 1) too many items are included 
on the sensitive products list, 2) the rules restraining trade remedy 
measures are too minimal, 3) there is insufficient regulation on non-tariff 
barriers, 4) there is an absence of tangible measures for trade facilitation, 
5) measures need to be taken to increase human capital among LDC 
contracting parties, and 6) no current regulation covers export control. 
Additionally, SAFTA should be amended to reduce anti-dumping 
measures and discourage anti-dumping investigation to increase regional 
trade among contracting states. This section will examine these 
impediments and suggest some possible resolutions.  
A. Matters That SAFTA Over-Regulates 
1)  SAFTA’s sensitive goods lists are too extensive 
Under SAFTA, the lists of sensitive goods of individual contracting 
parties are over-inclusive and include important items that have potential 
for sub-regional trade. Most of the main export items of the LDC 
contracting parties are included in the sensitive list of products of their 
partner countries. Afghanistan’s primary exports are dried fruits, carpets, 
                                                           
25 Id. r.8(b), 9 (follow “Rules of Origin Requirements (Annex C)” hyperlink then “View Full 
Text”).  
26 India-Sri Lanka PTA, supra note 8, r.7(b), 8 (follow “Rules of Origin Requirements (Annex 
C)” hyperlink). 
27 Revised Sensitive Lists Under SAFTA, supra note 5, Annex IV, r.9(b) (follow “Rules of 
Origin” hyperlink).  
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fresh fruits, wool, cotton, and vegetables.28 Among the main exports 
from Bangladesh are woven garments, handicrafts, jute, pharmaceuticals, 
tea, ceramic products, and finished vessels.29 Bhutan’s main exports are 
chemical products, metal, wood, processed food, mineral products, 
textiles, stones, cement, and asbestos products.30 Marine fisheries, 
particularly tuna, and clothing items are the Maldives’ only notable 
merchandise exports.31 Nepal’s primary merchandise exports are carpets, 
clothing, grain, herbal treatments and oils, readymade garments, and jute 
goods.32 Because these countries have limited export baskets, SAFTA 
grants them only limited market access benefits.  
Goods with trade potential on sensitive lists also hinder trade by 
SAFTA’s developing contracting parties. For example, there is a 
possibility for welfare-improving trade creation between India and 
Pakistan in wheat.33 There is also potential for poultry and other 
livestock exports from Pakistan to India.34 However, many of these 
products with natural trade prospects between contracting parties are 
included in other countries’ sensitive lists. Because of this, SAFTA’s 
sensitive list of goods is inhibiting the natural proliferation of trade 
among its members.  
2) Impact of over-inclusive sensitive lists 
The long list of sensitive products is an attempt to insulate domestic 
markets from sub-regional competition. However, official trade barriers 
between SAFTA contracting parties do not always succeed in preventing 
movement of goods across borders. Instead, they merely encourage a 
shift in the modes of border crossing from legal channels to illegal 
smuggling. For example, if Bangladesh lowered its tariff under SAFTA, 
the comparative benefit of smuggling sugar from India into Bangladesh 
                                                           
28 Afg. Chamber of Commerce, Exports, http://www.afghanchamber.com/about/Exports.htm 
(last visited Oct. 26, 2010). 
29 Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review of Bangladesh: Report by the Secretariat, 
¶¶ 7, 26, WT/TPR/S/168/Rev.1 (Nov. 15, 2006); Md. Joynal Abedin, Regional Trade and Economic 
Cooperation in South Asia, THE DAILY STAR, Oct. 8, 2009, available at 
http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=108709.  
30 Bhutan Gov’t, Foreign Relation and Trade, 
http://www.bhutan.gov.bt/government/abt_foreign.php (last visited Oct. 26, 2010). 
31 See Ministry of Econ. Dev., Maldives, International Trade: Regional, 
http://www.trade.gov.mv/?lid=23 (last visited Oct. 26, 2010); Trade Policy Review Body, Trade 
Policy Review of Maldives: Report by the Secretariat, ¶ 12, WT/TPR/S/221/Rev.1 (Nov. 5, 2009). 
32 Working Party on the Accession of Nepal, May 22, 2000, Sept. 12, 2002, Aug. 15, 2003, ¶ 
85, WT/ACC/NPL/16 (Aug. 28, 2003); Nepal Exports, http://www.nepal.com/exports/ (last visited 
Oct. 26, 2010). 
33 Garry Pursell et al., Asia, in DISTORTIONS TO AGRICULTURAL INCENTIVES IN ASIA 339, 349 
(Kym Anderson & Will Martin eds., 2009). 
34 Id. 
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would likely decrease and more would be imported legally.35 While the 
price of sugar paid by Bangladeshi consumers may not change, the 
government would benefit from the potentially increased tariff revenue. 
If the tariff were removed altogether, the government’s revenue would 
disappear; but consumers would benefit from lower-priced sugar. As 
such, continuing to maintain high trade barriers in these sectors does not 
appear to be economically justifiable even from a mercantilist point of 
view. 
In response to consumer demand, similar illegal trade occurs 
between India and Pakistan which cannot be prevented by an over-
inclusive SAFTA’s sensitive goods list. Alternatively, goods shipped by 
legal means are sometimes routed through third-party countries to 
circumvent trade restrictions. These goods have a value of around half a 
billion per annum and include cloth, textiles, pharmaceuticals, 
machinery, cosmetics, jewelry, and tires.36 Due to the increased cost of 
transportation and customs duties paid to government authorities in third-
party countries, this shipping process increases the prices of goods that 
consumers have to pay. Reducing the number of items on the sensitive 
list to reduce these practices promotes welfare and trade within SAFTA 
without hurting legitimate trading interests of third parties. 
B. Matters That SAFTA Under-Regulates 
1) SAFTA provides minimal trade remedy measure restrictions 
SAFTA does very little to address the adoption of trade remedy 
measures. Any time there is a significant volume of exports from a 
SAFTA member, it is possible for the importing country to lobby its 
government for a suspension of preferential concessions on that good. 
SAFTA does nothing to constrain adoption of anti-dumping37 or 
countervailing measures38 other than a largely ineffectual clause 
                                                           
35 See generally Garry Pursell, Smuggling and the Economic Welfare Consequences of an FTA: 
A Case Study of India- Bangladesh Trade in Sugar (Austl. S. Asia Res. Ctr., Austl. Nat’l Univ., 
ASARC Working Paper No. 2007/5, 2007), available at 
http://rspas.anu.edu.au/papers/asarc/WP2007_05.pdf (arguing, inter alia, that the smuggling of goods 
between Bangladesh and India has economic consequences that “can be analyzed following normal 
principles”). 
36 Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review of Pakistan, Report by the Secretariat, at 
49, WT/TPR/S/193/Rev.1 (May 20, 2008). 
37 “If a company exports a product at a price lower than the price it normally charges on its 
own home market, it is said to be ‘dumping’ the product.” WTO, Anti-dumping, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2010). 
38 Countervailing measures may lead to an “extra duty (‘countervailing duty’) on subsidized 
imports that are found to be hurting domestic producers.” WTO, Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/scm_e.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2010). 
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requiring contracting parties to pay special regard to LDCs and to 
consider accepting price undertakings offered by LDC exporters.39 If an 
investigation for anti-dumping is commenced, in the absence of an 
express obligation to accept a price undertaking from LDC exporters, 
this soft rule is unlikely to have any effect. 
Among SAFTA contracting parties, India is a frequent user of anti-
dumping measures.40 According to its reports to the WTO, India initiated 
596 anti-dumping investigations and imposed anti-dumping measures in 
419 of those cases from January 1995 through December 2009.41 
Pakistan also occasionally resorts to anti-dumping measures; over the 
same period it initiated fifty-three investigations and imposed measures 
in twenty-four cases.42 It has imposed anti-dumping measures on 
Bangladeshi and Nepalese exporters but not to Sri Lankan exporters.43 
With regard to exporters from its SAFTA partners, Pakistan only once 
initiated an investigation against Indian exporters—and it imposed anti-
dumping measures on that occasion.44  
During that same period there were no reported investigations 
initiated and no countervailing measures taken in all intra-SAFTA 
trade.45 This is consistent with the current global trend. The reports to the 
WTO during the above period show that there were only 245 
countervailing investigations initiated and 139 countervailing measures 
taken by the WTO member states.46 These are paltry figures compared to 
                                                           
39 See SAFTA, supra note 2, art. 11(a).  
40 See Ctr. for the Analysis of Reg’l Integration at Sussex, Qualitative Analysis of a Potential 
Free Trade Agreement Between the European Union and India: Annex 1: Analysis of Trade 
Production Structures and Implications for Non-Tariff Barriers, Services and Regulatory Parts of an 
FTA, at 11, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2007/july/tradoc_135346.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 
2010). 
41 See WTO, Anti-dumping Initiations: By Reporting Member from 01/01/95 to 31/12/09, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/ad_init_rep_member_e.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2010) 
[hereinafter Anti-dumping Initiations]; WTO, Anti-dumping Measures: By Reporting Member from 
01/01/95 to 31/12/09, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/ad_meas_rep_member_e.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2010) [hereinafter Anti-dumping Measures] (these include anti-dumping 
investigations against Bangladeshi, Nepalese, and Sri Lankan exporters and show India imposed 
anti-dumping measures against exporters from Bangladesh and Nepal). 
42 Anti-dumping Initiations, supra note 41; Anti-dumping Measures, supra note 41.  
43 WTO, AD Initiations: Reporting Member vs Exporting Country from 01/01/95 to: 31/12/08, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/ad_init_rep_exp_e.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2010); 
WTO, AD Measures: Reporting Member vs Exporting Country from 01/01/95 to31/12/08, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/ad_meas_rep_exp_e.pdf (last visited 12 Mar. 12, 2010). 
44 See Pakistan Nat’l Tariff Comm’n, Anti-dumping Investigations, 
http://www.ntc.gov.pk/adint.asp (last visited Oct. 26, 2010).  
45 See WTO, Countervailing Initiations: Reporting Member vs Exporting Country 01/01/1995 - 
31/12/2009, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/cvd_init_rep_exp_e.pdf [hereinafter 
Countervailing Initiations]; WTO, Countervailing Measures: Reporting Member vs Exporting 
Country 01/01/95 - 31/12/09, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/cvd_meas_rep_exp_e.pdf 
[hereinafter Countervailing Measures]. 
46 Countervailing Initiations, supra note 45; Countervailing Measures, supra note 45.  
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the 3675 anti-dumping investigations initiated and 2374 anti-dumping 
measures taken during the period of January 1995 through December 
2009.47 
The prevailing low incidence of countervailing measures in intra-
SAARC trade might partially be explained by the limited economic 
capacity of governments of the contracting parties to subsidize exports. 
However, the generally low incidence of anti-dumping measures in intra-
SAFTA trade may not be a good indicator of what may occur over time 
as internal trade increases. Arguably, the low incidence of anti-dumping 
measures is more a reflection of the low export volume of SAFTA 
contracting parties to the Indian market than an illustration of India’s 
firm commitment to refrain from anti-dumping measures against its 
partner countries. Since anti-dumping measures generally target the most 
competitive producers, the relative lack of anti-dumping or 
countervailing duties may be explicable by the relatively low volume of 
intra-regional trade.  
The adoption of anti-dumping duties between SAFTA members once 
led to the invoking of the WTO Dispute Settlement procedure.48 On 
January 28, 2004, Bangladesh requested consultations with India 
regarding an anti-dumping measure imposed by India on imports of lead 
acid batteries from Bangladesh.49 Bangladesh claimed, inter alia, that the 
anti-dumping investigation by Indian authorities was initiated even 
though the applicant did not establish that it represented the domestic 
industry. The investigation proceeded against the Bangladeshi exporters 
even though the value of the exports was negligible.50 The authorities of 
the two countries reached a mutually acceptable solution as India 
withdrew the anti-dumping measure.51 However, this case clearly shows 
that anti-dumping actions are an important issue in intra-SAFTA trade. 
Most likely, the dispute in this case was settled before proceeding to a 
panel because of the public attention it received. It was the first and only 
case thus far to have an LDC member country of the WTO invoke the 
Dispute Settlement Body. Future cases may not be settled so easily.  
The vast scope of trade remedy measures in internal trade is a 
troublesome problem that SAFTA fails to adequately address. If the 
contracting parties continue to use the flexibility of trade remedy 
                                                           
47 Countervailing Initiations, supra note 45; Countervailing Measures, supra note 45. 
48 See WTO, India—Anti-dumping Measure on Batteries from Bangladesh, WT/DS306/1 (Feb. 
2, 2004), available at http://www.wtocenter.org.tw/SmartKMS/fileviewer?id=41409 [hereinafter  
India—Anti-dumping]. 
49 Id.  
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
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measures in intra-SAFTA trade, it will effectively nullify the tariff 
concessions under SAFTA. Assuming the contracting parties cannot 
agree to dispense with these measures in their internal trade, they should 
nonetheless take measures such as applying a different threshold for 
using anti-dumping rules. This would provide some relief to intra-
SAFTA exporters in cases where anti-dumping investigations would be 
conducted against third parties, thereby ensuring that any trade 
concessions offered under SAFTA would not easily succumb to 
protectionist impulses. 
2) SAFTA insufficiently addresses non-tariff barriers 
As the role of tariff barriers in protection of domestic industries 
declines, nontariff barriers are increasingly becoming the tools of choice 
to serve protectionist obsessions.52 These nontariff barriers include 
quality control of the products and the ease with which a product can be 
transported across country lines.53 Hence, the proliferation of both tariff 
barriers and nontariff barriers has endangered the meaningful increase of 
trade by a PTA. Unless the nontariff barriers are effectively dismantled 
among contracting parties in a PTA, the benefit derived from tariff 
reduction schemes will be minimal.54 Dismayingly, SAFTA provides 
inadequate regulations of nontariff barriers in intra-SAFTA trade. Under 
SAFTA Article 7(4), the contracting parties’ obligation is limited to 
notification of their non-tariff and para-tariff barriers to the SAFTA 
Committee of Experts (COE).55 The COE can review these notifications, 
scrutinize their conformity with the relevant WTO provisions, and 
recommend the abolition of those measures or the execution of those 
measures in the least trade-restrictive manner possible.  
However, even if the COE issues recommendations, SAFTA is 
conspicuously silent on the contracting parties’ obligations with regard to 
the COE’s recommendations. Furthermore, the assessment criteria for the 
COE are the relevant WTO rules; therefore, SAFTA does not give the 
contracting parties who are WTO members any additional rights beyond 
what they already have, such as raising any WTO-inconsistent nontariff 
barriers to the WTO’s dispute settlement system.  
                                                           
52 See generally Peace News Team, SAARC: ‘Non-Tariff Barriers Must Go,’ AMAN NEWS, 
Apr. 4, 2010, http://amannews.com/english/2010/04/saarc-‘non-tariff-barriers-must-go’/ (reporting 
that SAARC has urged its member countries to reduce the amount of nontariff barriers in order to 
facilitate direct trade). 
53 See generally John C. Beghin, Nontariff Barriers, (Ctr. for Agric. & Rural Dev., Iowa State 
Univ., Working Paper No. 06-WP 438, 2006), available at 
http://www.card.iastate.edu/publications/DBS/PDFFiles/06wp438.pdf (describing the general types 
of nontariff barriers and their economic effects). 
54 See generally Peace News Team, supra note 52.  
55 SAFTA, supra note 2, art. 7(4). 
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To strengthen intra-SAFTA trade, the contracting parties must tackle 
nontariff barriers to intra-SAFTA trade more effectively. The national 
product standards of each country may serve legitimate purposes, such as 
implementing public policies to ensure product safety, but they also 
inhibit importation. Disparate product standards among the countries 
may also significantly restrain the cross-border flow of goods.56 If the 
contracting parties can achieve the harmonization of domestic product 
standards and recognition of reciprocal certifications as expressed in 
Article 8(a) of SAFTA, intra-SAFTA imports would be processed at a 
faster pace. By signing the Agreement on the Establishment of South 
Asian Regional Standards Organization (SARSO) that provides for the 
establishment of a South Asian Standards Organization (Organization)57 
the contracting parties have taken a step in the right direction.  
The main objectives of the Organization are the harmonization of 
national standards of the SAARC countries to create a freer flow of 
goods and services in the sub-region, and the persuasion of member 
countries to use international standards58 through replicating them as 
SAARC standards.59 SARSO, which has yet to take force, does not have 
rules of procedure and, hence, the extent of its efficacy remains 
uncertain. However, given that the proposed Organization is granted full 
legal personality,60 it may have sufficient jurisdiction to function 
properly and provide a much needed impetus to the promotion of intra-
SAFTA trade. Furthermore, the Organization may help to lessen 
administrative burdens of national customs and standard testing 
authorities of the SAARC countries. Therefore, it is evident that 
increased regulation on non-tariff barriers will be financially beneficial 
to the contracting parties. While tackling nontariff barriers such as tariff 
escalation, tariff rate quota, and the abolition of import licensing may be 
difficult, the formulation of sub-regional product standards may not be so 
daunting.  
3) SAFTA should expand coverage of trade in services  
                                                           
56 See John Ravenhill, Fighting Irrelevance: An Economic Community ‘with ASEAN 
Characteristics’ 12-13 (Austl. Nat’l Univ. Dep’t of Int’l Relations, Working Paper No. 2007/3, 
2007), available at http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/ir/pubs/work_papers/07-3.pdf.  
57 Agreement on the Establishment of South Asian Regional Standards Organization (SARSO), 
art. 1(i), Aug. 3, 2008, http://www.saarc-sec.org/userfiles/SARSOAgreement31July2008.doc 
(SAARC) [hereinafter SARSO]. 
58 As published by bodies such as the International Organization for Standardization, the 
International Electrotechnical Commission, etc. 
59 SARSO, supra note 57, art. 2. 
60 Id. art. 1(ii). 
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It is very curious that trade in services was not at all covered by 
SAFTA until April of this year, when a PTA was signed during a summit 
of heads of state.61 Due to the advancement of technology, including 
transportation and communication systems, cross-border trade in services 
is rapidly expanding. If trade in services had not been included in the 
PTA, a substantial percentage of sub-regional trade between the 
contracting parties would have been left out of its scope. Presently, 
because of their economic factor endowments, the contracting parties 
stand a superior chance of enhancing intra-SAFTA trade in services than 
in goods.62  
The SATIS contracting parties are endowed with a large number of 
low skilled or unskilled labor. Therefore, in the WTO negotiations, they 
strongly advocate for freer movement of natural persons across borders. 
However, the persuasiveness of their argument for liberalization in the 
WTO wanes, if the movement of natural persons is not allowed within 
the sub-regional framework to at least some degree. To benefit from the 
economies of scale, the contracting parties should make the PTA in 
services a comprehensive PTA. Furthermore, unlike liberalization in 
trade in goods, liberalization in trade in services generally does not entail 
any loss of tariff revenue, which should make it easier to liberalize.  
However, in view of the dismal experience of the SAFTA’s 
liberalization in goods, it is difficult to be sanguine about the prospect of 
the depth of market access in the new PTA in services. But the a multo 
fortiori of expecting the creation of new liberalization is the undertaking 
that the contracting parties have made in paragraph 7 of Annex I to the 
SATIS. They have agreed to make liberalization commitments exceeding 
their multilateral commitments both in terms of the coverage of sectors 
as well as modal improvement in those sectors. 
The opening of the market for services under the SATIS could prove 
to be crucial as the GATS commitments of the SATIS contracting 
parties; except in Nepal, where the commitments are very narrow. 
Therefore, any new liberalization commitment can create trade without 
raising barriers to third parties. At the WTO, Bangladesh originally made 
commitments only in the sub-sector of five star hotel and lodging 
services within the broader tourism and travel related services sector63 
                                                           
61 SAARC Agreement on Trade in Services (SATIS), Apr. 29, 2010, available at 
http://commerce.nic.in/trade/SAARC Agreement on Trade in Services SATS.pdf [hereinafter 
SATIS]. 
62 See Douglas Jayasekera, Address at the ARTNeT Consultative Meeting on Bridging the 
Development Gaps in the GMS: Progress of Liberalization of Trade in Services in SAFTA (June 2, 
2009), available at http://www.unescap.org/tid/artnet/mtg/bridging_s3douglas.pdf.  
63 WTO General Agreement in Services, Bangladesh: Schedule of Specific Commitments, 
WTO Doc GATS/SC/8 (15 April 1994). 
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and subsequently made commitments in telecommunications sector.64 
India has made commitments only in around a quarter of the sub-
sectors.65 Even in those sub-sectors which are covered, in most cases, 
India has made no commitment. In mode 1, 2, and 4 very little 
commitment has been made by India beyond its horizontal commitments. 
The Maldives has only made commitments in accounting, auditing and 
book-keeping services, computer and related services sub-sectors.66  
Pakistan has made GATS commitments in services incidental to 
agriculture and forestry, services incidental to mining, engineering 
services, computer and related services sectors, research and 
development services in natural sciences, telecommunication services, 
insurance and insurance related services, banking services, hospital 
services and medical and dental service, hotels and restaurants, and travel 
agencies and tour operator services.67 Sri Lanka initially made 
commitments only in hotel and lodging services and travel agency and 
tour operation services sub-sectors of the tourism and travel related 
services68 sector and later undertook commitments in 
telecommunications services and insurance and banking, sub-sectors.69  
In the business services sector, Nepalese commitments include legal 
services, accounting, auditing and book-keeping services, architectural 
services, engineering services, veterinary services, computer and related 
services, research and development services, rental and leasing services 
without operators, advertising services, market research service and 
public opinion polling services, management consulting services, 
                                                           
64 WTO General Agreement in Services, Bangladesh: Schedule of Specific Commitments, 
Supplement 1, WTO Doc GATS/SC/8/Suppl.1 (11 April 1997). 
65 WTO General Agreement in Services, India: Schedule of Specific Commitments, WTO Doc 
GATS/SC/42 (Apr. 15, 1994); WTO General Agreement in Services, India: Schedule of Specific 
Commitments, Supplement 1, WTO Doc GATS/SC/42/Suppl.1 (July 28, 1995); WTO General 
Agreement in Services, India: Schedule of Specific Commitments, Supplement 2, WTO Doc 
GATS/SC/42/Suppl.2 (July 28, 1995). 
66 WTO General Agreement in Services, Maldives: Schedule of Specific Commitments, WTO 
Doc GATS/SC/101 (Aug. 30, 1995). 
67 WTO General Agreement in Services, Pakistan: Schedule of Specific Commitments, WTO 
Doc GATS/SC/67 (Apr. 15, 1994); WTO General Agreement in Services, Pakistan: Schedule of 
Specific Commitments, Supplement 1, WTO Doc GATS/SC/67.Suppl.1 (July 28, 1995); WTO 
General Agreement in Services, Pakistan: Schedule of Specific Commitments, Supplement 2, WTO 
Doc GATS/SC/67.Supp2 (Apr. 11, 1997); WTO General Agreement in Services, Pakistan: Schedule 
of Specific Commitments, Supplement 2, Revision, WTO Doc GATS/SC/67.Suppl.2/Rev.1 (Feb. 16, 
1998); WTO General Agreement in Services, Pakistan: Schedule of Specific Commitments, 
Supplement 3, WTO Doc GATS/SC/67.Suppl.3 (Feb. 26, 1998). 
68 WTO General Agreement in Services, Sri Lanka: Schedule of Specific Commitments, WTO 
Doc GATS/SC/79 (Apr. 15, 1994). 
69 WTO General Agreement in Services, Sri Lanka: Schedule of Specific Commitments, 
Supplement 1, WTO Doc GATS/SC/79/Suupl.1 (Apr. 11, 1997); WTO General Agreement in 
Services, Sri Lanka: Schedule of Specific Commitments, Supplement 2, WTO Doc 
GATS/SC/79/Suupl.1 (Feb. 26, 1998). 
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technical testing and analysis services.70 In the communication services 
sector, it has made commitments in courier services and 
telecommunications services sub-sectors.71 It has also made 
commitments in different sub-sectors of the other nine broad service 
sectors.72 Presumably, Nepal has made significantly more commitments 
in WTO service schedule because of the negotiations as part of its 
accession in the WTO—an indication of the mercantilist nature of the 
WTO accession process that requires LDCs to offer more liberalization 
commitments than average developing countries.73 Arguably, this is also 
contrary to the spirit of Article XI:2 of the WTO Agreement, which 
provides that LDCs would only need to undertake commitments and 
concessions to the extent commensurate with their development, 
financial, and trade needs or administrative and institutional capabilities. 
Two things stand out from the WTO schedule of services of the 
SATIS contracting parties. First, there is very little commitment made in 
mode 4 except for some provision for temporary entry of natural persons, 
high level executives, and technical professionals. Second, various 
restrictions, mainly in the form of foreign equity ceilings, apply with 
respect to foreign investments under mode 3. Hence, the SATIS 
liberalization in these two areas can create trade without hurting third 
parties interests. The service schedule of the SATIS contracting parties, 
of course, cannot capture the actual barrier to market access as can the 
difference between bound and applied tariffs in goods. Applied laws and 
regulations in services may well be more liberal than the binding 
commitments made in the WTO; nonetheless, the WTO service schedule 
is significant as it shows the extent of binding commitments, and any 
binding commitments over and above that under the SATIS would give 
predictability of access to the sub-regional service providers. The scope 
of backtracking being eliminated, there should be impetus for greater 
investment that can—in addition to giving consumers more choices—
create jobs. 
A significant barrier against mode 4 movements of professionals is 
the necessity of recognition of their professional qualifications. The 
current provision in the SATIS in this regard is lackluster and worded in 
terms of aspiration rather than any binding agreement. In this regard, the 
SATIS may take note of the development in the ASEAN. The ASEAN 
contracting parties have concluded Mutual Recognition Arrangements 
                                                           
70 WTO General Agreement in Services, The Kingdom of Nepal: Schedule of Specific 
Commitments, WTO Doc GATS/SC/139 (Aug. 30, 2004). 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Kent Jones, The Political Economy of WTO Accession: The Unfinished Business of 
Universal Membership, 8 WORLD TRADE REV. 279, 295-96 (2009). 
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(MRAs) that allow the qualifications of professional services suppliers of 
one contracting party to be mutually recognized by all the contracting 
parties. Currently, they have concluded seven MRAs covering seven 
professional services, namely: accountancy, architecture, engineering, 
nursing services, dental practitioners, medical practitioners, and 
surveying qualifications.74 Under these Agreements, professionals who 
fulfill some educational and other minimum requirements in their own 
country would be eligible for recognition by the other contracting parties. 
The SATIS contracting parties should provide for such concrete 
provisions. 
4) SAFTA lacks tangible measures for trade facilitation 
Tariff and nontariff liberalization needs to be accompanied by 
measures to facilitate trade in the sub-region. The member countries have 
set high standards for facilitating internal trade but no real enforcement 
mechanism has been put in place to achieve it. For example, transit 
facilities across the contracting party states would greatly enhance a freer 
flow of goods and certain services, especially for the three landlocked 
contracting parties of Nepal, Bhutan, and Afghanistan. However, trade 
facilitation remains an aspiration with no mechanism in place for its 
realization.75 The sub-regional transport arrangements are basically 
bilateral deals. For instance, the India-Bhutan PTA allows imported and 
exported goods (other than those from India) to and from Bhutan to pass 
thorough Indian territories without being subjected to any customs duties 
or trade restrictions.76 This agreement also designates specific exit and 
entry points in India through which imports and exports of Bhutan can be 
                                                           
74 ASEAN Mutual Recognition Arrangement Framework on Accountancy Services (Feb. 26, 
2009), available at http://www.aseansec.org/22225.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2010); ASEAN Mutual 
Recognition Arrangement on Architectural Services (Nov. 19, 2007), available at 
http://www.aseansec.org/21137.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2010); ASEAN Mutual Recognition 
Arrangement on Engineering Services (Dec. 6, 2006), available at 
http://www.aseansec.org/18009.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2010); ASEAN Mutual Recognition 
Arrangement on Nursing Services (Dec. 8, 2006), available at http://www.aseansec.org/19210.htm 
(last visited Sept. 18, 2010); ASEAN Mutual Recognition Arrangement on Dental Practitioners (Feb. 
26, 2009), available at http://www.aseansec.org/22228.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2010); ASEAN 
Mutual Recognition Arrangement on Medical Practitioners  (Feb. 26, 2009), available at 
http://www.aseansec.org/22231.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2010); ASEAN Framework Arrangement 
for the Mutual Recognition of Surveying Qualifications (Nov. 19, 2007), available at 
http://www.aseansec.org/21139.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2010). 
75 See Governor Stresses Need for Trade Facilitation at SAARC Seminar Inaugural, 
Daijiworld.com, Aug. 5, 2010, 
http://www.daijiworld.com/news/news_disp.asp?n_id=82686&n_tit=Governor+Stresses+Need+for+
Trade+Facilitation+at+SAARC+Seminar+Inaugural++.  
76 See Agreement on Trade, Commerce and Transit between the Government of the Republic of 
India and the Royal Government of Bhutan, India-Bhutan, art. V, July 28, 2006, India Dep’t of 
Commerce, available at http://www.commerce.nic.in/trade/bhutan.pdf. 
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transshipped.77 In a similar vein, a transit facility is also in place between 
Nepal and India with designated entry and exit points in Indian territories 
for goods to move to and from Nepal.78 
The legal framework for cross-border movement of goods and 
services can only have a moderate impact on trade flow unless a physical 
infrastructure to support that trade flow exists—namely, an efficient 
transportation network capable of facilitating speedy movement. It is 
crucial that the contracting parties have an efficient network of water, 
road, railway, and air transportation—all modes of transportation 
available to assist freer and smoother movement of goods and services 
throughout the sub-region. The transit framework within the sub-region 
needs to cover all SAFTA contracting parties and it must be dealt with in 
the SAARC’s institutional framework. Bilateral transit arrangements 
cannot substitute for a sub-region wide integrated transport framework. 
Although there is concern about potentially increased movement of 
terrorists across borders if the sub-regional borders are more open, these 
concerns seem to exaggerate the threat.  It is not clear that a sub-region 
wide transit network would increase the threat of terrorism. Moreover, 
protected borders do not appear to have been able to prevent the 
movement of terrorists in the past. 
Relaxing travel and visa restrictions to facilitate movement of natural 
persons across the sub-region would create more trade in transportation 
and tourism services. The contracting parties have recognized the 
importance of the promotion of sub-regional tourism79 but no measure to 
facilitate cross-border movement of natural persons has yet been taken. 
Since trade is not a static phenomenon, there might be unexplored areas 
of trade and investment between the contracting parties. Relaxing travel 
restrictions may therefore also encourage business contacts within the 
sub-region, which in turn could pave the way for the discovery of new 
areas of trade and exploration of potential industries for joint venture or 
direct foreign investment flow. To facilitate this, contracting parties 
ought to take prompt steps to facilitate the creation of business visitor 
visas for entrepreneurs from the other contracting parties. 
5) SAFTA does not address how it will develop capacity building of 
LDC contracting parties 
Annex II of SAFTA provides a detailed list of areas where the 
developing contracting parties have vowed to assist LDC contracting 
                                                           
77 Id. at 4 (Protocol with Reference to Article V). 
78 India-Nepal PTA, supra note 20, Annexure A.  
79 See Declaration of the Fifteenth SAARC Summit, Aug. 2-3, ¶ 24, 2008, http://www.saarc-
sec.org/SAARC-Summit/7/ (follow “Fifteenth SAARC Summit” hyperlink).  
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parties in providing technical assistance for building trade capacity. The 
identified areas include training and human resources development in 
trade; development of trade-related institutions; development of trade 
negotiating skills; development of tariff-related laws; customs procedure; 
trade policy reforms; and assistance in improvement of national capacity 
building in different WTO agreements and promotion of exports.80 
However, SAFTA is silent as to the mode of implementation of these 
laudable objectives, as well as the source of the logistics to realize them. 
Obviously, this is frustrating for LDCs because the existence of these 
objectives creates legitimate—albeit unfulfilled—expectations of 
opportunities. If these opportunities are continually hindered, LDCs will 
feel increasingly disenchanted with SAFTA. 
Capacity building in some of the above-mentioned areas does not 
demand a high degree of capital. India is one of the most vocal 
developing country members of the WTO and has ample expertise about 
WTO rules-related issues, having the experience of participating in a 
significant number of WTO disputes. Since the WTO’s inception, India 
has invoked the WTO’s dispute settlement procedure in eighteen cases as 
complainant and has participated as respondent in twenty cases.81 Among 
the other contracting parties, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have invoked the 
dispute settlement system as complainant in only one case each, and 
Pakistan has done so in only three cases as complainant and two cases as 
respondent.82 Because of India’s experience in WTO dispute settlement 
and its relatively large pool of specialists, it should assume the lion’s 
share of the burden of increasing the human capital of the LDC 
contracting parties. The developing contracting parties should apportion 
their budgetary responsibilities and specify their plans to realize the 
objectives aimed at trade capacity building of LDC contracting parties as 
mentioned in SAFTA.  
Admittedly, all SAFTA contracting parties can seek legal assistance 
on WTO rules from the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL), a 
Geneva-based intergovernmental organization, either by being a member 
of the same or through special privileges as LDCs.83 However, the 
                                                           
80 Sri Lanka Dep’t of Commerce, Areas identified for Technical Assistance to Least Developed 
Contracting States Under Article 11(d) of SAFTA Agreement, Aug. 31 – Sept. 3, 2005,  available at  
http://www.doc.gov.lk/web/southasian_freetrade_technical.php (last visited Oct. 28, 2010). 
81 WTO, Dispute Settlement: Disputes by Country/Territory, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_E/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2010). 
82 Id. 
83 For ACWL’s mandate and scope, see The Agreement Establishing the Advisory Centre on 
WTO Law, Nov. 30, 1999, 2299 U.N.T.S. 249; for a list of countries eligible for ACWL assistance , 
see ACWL: Members, http://www.acwl.ch/e/members/members.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2010). 
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ACWL charges fees for some of its services.84 In addition, when both 
parties to a dispute relating to WTO rules approach the ACWL for 
advice, to avoid any conflict of interest the ACWL advises only the party 
that approached it first.85 This aspect of the ACWL’s modus operandi has 
at times been cleverly used by some member states that have approached 
the organization simply to deny the opposing party any chance of being 
served by the ACWL in the same case.86 More importantly, the mandate 
of the ACWL is essentially limited to the role of providing assistance 
regarding WTO rules and procedure. Therefore, the ACWL cannot be a 
proxy for the trade capacity building of LDC contracting parties of 
SAFTA, as SAFTA’s envisioned scope of capacity building is much 
more extensive than the ACWL’s scope of activities. 
6) SAFTA does not regulate export control 
SAFTA does not contain any provision relating to the control of 
exports between the contracting parties. Generally, export prohibitions in 
PTAs do not attract much attention either in the negotiation for PTAs or 
in scholarly literature, as they are commonly perceived to hurt the 
interests of imposing countries more than the countries resorting to them. 
However, although export control would directly limit the income of the 
domestic producers, it may also have negative impacts on the potential 
importing countries. This may happen in a number of ways. The 
producers of importing countries may rely on imported inputs for use in 
their production chains. A country may rely on imports simply because 
its domestic industry may not produce sufficient similar products to meet 
national demand. Import of technological products may be critical for 
improving the efficiency of production process.  
Some advanced economies may employ export control more often 
for strategic rather than trade-related purposes, as these states have an 
interest in limiting access to technologies that are potentially 
compromising to their national security.87 It is understandable that by 
                                                           
84 Mgmt. Board of the Advisory Ctr. on WTO Law, Billing Policy and Revised Time Budget, 
ACWL/MB/D/2004/3 (Mar. 26, 2004), available at 
http://www.acwl.ch/e/documents/time_budget_e.pdf. 
85 Frieder Roessler, Exec. Dir., Advisory Ctr. on WTO Law, Lecture at the Sydney Law 
School: Developing Countries in WTO Dispute Settlement (Mar. 23, 2010). 
86 Id. 
87 See Mitchel B. Wallerstein, Losing Controls- How U.S. Export Restrictions Jeopardize 
National Security and Harm Competitiveness, 88 FOREIGN AFF. 11, 12 (2009) (discussing recent 
export control policy in the United States and arguing for controls to be used more discriminately); 
Joanna Bonarriva, Michelle Koscielski & Edward Wilson, Export Controls: An Overview of Their 
Use, Economic Effects, and Treatment in the Global Trading System 3-5 (Aug. 2009) (U.S. Int’l 
Trade Comm’n, Working Paper No. ID-23, 2009), available at 
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/working_papers/ID-23.pdf (outlining the general types of 
export controls and their economic and noneconomic effects). 
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agreeing to a PTA, SAFTA contracting parties would not be prepared to 
compromise their right to impose export control that they may think 
jeopardize national security.  
However, this issue of export control may have the economic 
implication of inhibiting internal trade between the parties, because the 
contracting parties—particularly India—typically resort to export bans to 
counter temporary surges in the prices of essential foodstuffs.88 However, 
the economic rationale of temporary bans on exports to lower the prices 
in a domestic market is dubious, as passing on the benefit of supposedly 
lower costs to consumers remains a difficult exercise.89 In recognition of 
the necessity of cooperation among member countries in this regard, 
SAARC member countries have signed an agreement providing for the 
establishment of a SAARC Food Bank to serve as a sub-regional food 
security stock for the member countries.90 It would be wise if they 
adopted rules proscribing total ban or excessive export taxes for 
foodstuffs destined for other contracting parties.  
C. SAFTA and Anti-dumping Measures 
1) Increased anti-dumping measures may impede regional trade 
Once trade between the contracting parties expands in volume, it is 
likely that anti-dumping measures will consistently target sub-regional 
producers. Hence, the current low prevalence of trade remedy measures 
in intra-SAFTA trade is not a reliable indication of what may happen in 
the medium or long term. Furthermore, conducting anti-dumping 
investigations requires formal expertise in trade administration matters, 
as can be inferred from the anti-dumping statistics. Since the formation 
of the WTO, no LDC thus far has initiated any anti-dumping 
investigations or adopted any anti-dumping measures.91 It is the member 
countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development92 and large developing countries like Brazil, China, Egypt, 
                                                           
88 M. Rafiqul Islam & Md. Rizwanul Islam, The Global Food Crisis and Lacklustre 
Agricultural Trade Liberalisation: Demystifying their Nexus Underpinning Reform, 10 J. WORLD 
INVESTMENT & TRADE 679, 684 (2009). 
89 Bonarriva et al., supra note 87, at 4-5. 
90 Agreement on Establishing the SAARC Food Bank, pmbl., art. II,  Apr. 3, 2007, available at 
http://www.saarc-sec.org/userfiles/FoodBank.doc. 
91
 See Anti-dumping Initiations, supra note 41; Anti-dumping Measures, supra note 41. See 
generally WTO Comm. on Anti-dumping Practices, Reports under Article 16.4 of the Agreement: 
Note by the Secretariat, G/ADP/N/182- G/ADP/N/198 (Feb. 19, 2009 - Mar. 15, 2010) (monthly 
WTO anti-dumping reports). 
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India, and South Africa that are the frequent users of anti-dumping 
measures.93 However, these statistics do not capture the use of anti-
dumping measures in proportion to the volume of total imports. In other 
words, developed countries and large developing countries may have 
resorted to anti-dumping measures more than LDCs because they engage 
in more trade. However, given that a corporation must have significant 
market power to engage in dumping, it is likely that producers in the 
economically advanced countries are better positioned to engage in 
dumping. It is also probable that LDCs are prevented from resorting to 
anti-dumping measures because of their lack of institutional capacity and 
sufficient market power. Therefore, it appears likely that if the national 
trade expertise base matures, and the market power of corporations in 
LDCs increases, the LDCs will resort to anti-dumping measures in intra-
PTA trade.  
While trade remedy measures such as anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties are supposed reactions to the unfair trade practices 
of exporters, in practice they are often protectionist devices. The danger 
of their pervasive usage is aggravated in tough financial times, as 
governments often bow to the protectionist demands of their domestic 
industries. For instance, during the recent financial crisis—from July to 
December 2008—the WTO Secretariat noted that its member states 
initiated seventeen percent more anti-dumping investigations than during 
the same period in the previous year.94 Doctrinally, when governments 
pursue a PTA they express a desire to expand intra-regional trade, and 
trade remedy measures against PTA partners are antithetical to the 
commitment of the internal trade liberalization.95 Hence, it would be 
ideal if SAFTA abolished all forms of anti-dumping measures in intra-
SAFTA trade. However, in view of the current prevalence of anti-
dumping measures in SAFTA, this does not seem likely. But even if the 
contracting parties fall short of agreeing on total elimination of anti-
dumping measures in intra-SAFTA trade, there might still be a number 
of ways for them to curb the scope of such measures.  
                                                                                                                                  
http://www.oecd.org/countrieslist/0,3351,en_33873108_33844430_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited 
Oct. 26, 2010). 
93 Anti-dumping Measures, supra note 41. 
94 Press Release, WTO, Anti-dumping: WTO Secretariat Reports Increase in New Anti-
dumping Investigations (May 7, 2009), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres09_e/pr556_e.htm.  
95 See Comm. on Reg’l Trade Agreements, Synopsis of "Systemic" Issues Related to Regional 
Trade Agreements, ¶ 58(a), WT/REG/W/37 (Mar. 2, 2000); Comm. on Reg’l Trade Agreements, 
Note on the Meetings of 27 Nov. and 4-5 Dec. 1997, ¶ 26, WT/REG/M/15 (Jan. 13, 1998); Comm. 
on Reg’l Trade Agreements, Communication from Australia, ¶ 21, WT/REG/W/18, (Nov. 17, 1997). 
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2) Increasing the dumping margin threshold to discourage anti-
dumping investigation 
If the dumping margin threshold were increased it would discourage 
anti-dumping investigations. The WTO’s anti-dumping agreement—the 
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement)—provides that if 
the investigating authorities find that the margin of dumping is less than 
two percent of the export price, the investigation will not proceed.96 If 
SAFTA provides a higher threshold of dumping margin for exports from 
one contracting party to another, sub-regional exporters will benefit. 
Article 5.8 of Anti-Dumping Agreement also provides that anti-dumping 
investigations should cease with respect to a particular country if its 
dumped imports comprise less than three percent of the importing 
member’s like-product imports.97 Any higher threshold for imports from 
SAFTA would exempt their exporters from anti-dumping investigations. 
This would ensure that importers from the contracting parties with 
nominal market share will not have to bear the costs of defending anti-
dumping investigations. 
Article 8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement further provides that if an 
exporter under investigation for anti-dumping activities submits an 
assurance that export prices will be increased to wipe out the alleged 
dumping, the investigations may be discontinued.98 Currently, however, 
the importing member is not obliged to accept the price assurance. By 
incorporating a provision for the mandatory acceptance of price 
undertaking by SAFTA exporters, SAFTA would assist the exporters as 
well as save the time and resources of the anti-dumping investigation 
authority.  
Finally, Article 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires that 
any anti-dumping duty must not be maintained for more than five years 
from the imposition or five years after the most recent review, unless the 
relevant authorities determine that termination of the duty would likely 
cause recurrence of the dumping.99 SAFTA members may provide that 
an anti-dumping duty imposed against any other SAFTA member must 
be terminated within a shorter period. The contracting parties of some 
                                                           
96 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
1994, art. 5.8, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19-
adp.pdf [hereinafter Anti-Dumping Argeement]. 
97 The exception to this is when countries whose dumped imports individually account for less 
than three percent of an importing Member’s like-product imports, but collectively account for more 
than seven percent. See id.  
98 Id. art. 8.1.  
99 Id. art. 11.3. 
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PTAs among developing countries—namely the Andean Community, the 
Caribbean Community, the Central American Common Market, the 
Common Market of the Southern Cone, and the Union Économique et 
Monétaire Ouest-Africaine—have taken one or more of the above steps 
in this direction to provide momentum to the expansion of intra-regional 
trade.100 Admittedly, these PTAs are customs unions and SAFTA at this 
stage is merely a free trade agreement under the Enabling Clause. 
However, SAFTA contracting parties have the goal of progressively 
integrating into an economic union.101 Hence, they should either 
eliminate anti-dumping duties in their internal trade or make special 
concessions for anti-dumping measures as have the above-mentioned 
PTAs.  
3) Do special rules for anti-dumping measures against PTA 
partners have the potential to violate the Most Favored Nation 
rule? 
Theoretically, it is possible to argue that providing for any of these 
special provisions for limiting anti-dumping duties in intra-SAFTA trade 
would constitute special favors and violate the Most Favored Nation rule. 
However, the textual basis for such an argument appears to be rather 
fragile. This is because anti-dumping duties are inherently 
discriminatory. A country chooses to proceed with investigations against 
exporters based upon the reported complaints of their unfair trading 
practices. Whereas Article XXIV of GATT does not authorize WTO 
members to give any special concession in anti-dumping investigations, 
it also does not contain any proscription against doing so.102  
Again, there is nothing in the Anti-Dumping Agreement that can be 
construed to impose such a non-discriminatory obligation on PTA 
parties.103 Rather, the language of Article 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement suggests that a country adopting anti-dumping duties does in 
fact possess some discretionary powers.104 This article requires that if an 
anti-dumping duty is imposed, it will have to be collected on a non-
discriminatory basis from the imports of all sources that are found to 
have dumped, except from imports of those sources from which price 
                                                           
100 Robert Teh et al., Trade Remedy Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements, in REGIONAL 
RULES IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM (Antoni Estevadeordal, Kati Suominen, & Robert Teh 
eds., 2009). 
101 Declaration of the Eleventh SAARC Summit, ¶ 1, Jan. 4-6, 2002; Declaration of the Twelfth 
SAARC Summit, ¶ 3, Jan. 4-6, 2004; Declaration of the Thirteenth SAARC Summit, ¶ 14, Nov. 13, 
2005, Declaration of the Fourteenth SAARC Summit, ¶ 18, Apr. 3-4, 2007; all available at 
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102 See Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note 96. 
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undertakings have been accepted. Thus, a WTO member state cannot 
levy disparate anti-dumping duties, but even during the investigation 
stage it may exempt any exporter by accepting the party’s price 
undertaking. This shows, a fortiori, the scope of discretion that a WTO 
member may exercise in conducting anti-dumping investigations. 
Therefore, it does not appear that special anti-dumping rules for intra-
SAFTA trade, such as those suggested here, would violate any rules of 
the WTO. 
D. The Benefits of Tackling Subsidies in a PTA Are Difficult to 
Determine  
Some recent PTAs have attempted to restrict the use of subsidies in 
intra-PTA trade by providing that parties will eliminate—and will not re-
introduce—export subsidies on products destined for other partner 
countries.105 However, some types of subsidies cannot always be 
selectively applied. For instance, if a domestic industry is provided with 
input subsidies at the time of production with the aim of boosting that 
export, it would hurt competing industries in all other trading partners. It 
is difficult to conceive how such subsidies would not apply to exports 
sent to PTA partners. Hence, in the absence of multilateral rules, there 
appears to be very little that SAFTA contracting parties can do to 
eliminate subsidies in intra-SAFTA trade other than to require goods 
destined for other contracting parties to not be eligible for any form of 
express export subsidies. Any SAFTA disciplines on countervailing 
duties may not be feasible. 
In these ways, one can see that the over- and under-regulation of 
many areas of trade law by SAFTA leaves its own parties much less 
likely to take full advantage of the natural trade potential.  
IV. THE NECESSITY OF MOVING BEYOND DIRECT TRADE 
MEASURES 
To make SAFTA more effective, contracting parties must move 
beyond direct trading measures and make fundamental changes to 
SAFTA. These changes should include attracting Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) to industrialize their economies, inserting a dispute 
                                                           
105 See, e.g., Agreement Establishing the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area, ch. 
2, art. 3, Feb. 27, 2009, AUSTRALIA DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, available at 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/fta/asean/aanzfta/contents.html; Free Trade Agreement Between the 
Government of New Zealand and the Government of the People’s Republic of China, China-N.Z., 
ch. 6, art. 63, Apr. 7, 2008, available at http://www.chinafta.govt.nz/1-The-agreement/2-Text-of-the-
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settlement clause, creating a sub-regional competition policy framework, 
and marshaling trade-negotiating resources by establishing a permanent 
body of trade negotiation experts. 
A. SAARC Should Use SAFTA to Attract Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) 
Expert opinion on the ability of FDI to influence economic 
development varies sharply. Many arguments against FDI are principally 
arguments against employing lax regulations to attract FDI, not against 
the desirability of attracting FDI per se. Skepticism has been voiced that 
stiff competition among developing countries may spur a race to the 
bottom; that is, countries with lax environmental regulations might 
attract more FDI.106 However, it is undeniable that increased flow of FDI 
creates jobs and may increase trade performance.107 With chronic 
shortages of domestic capital, SAFTA contracting parties need to attract 
FDI to industrialize their economies.  
SAFTA contracting parties should formulate sub-regional rules to 
protect FDI for progressive economic integration. Although the impact of 
setting up a legal framework to protect FDI in a PTA is mixed and 
complex,108 a comprehensive sub-regional framework would not likely 
harm the SAARC sub-region’s standing as a favorable host of FDI. Such 
an initiative would also help to materialize SAARC’s aspired goal of 
eliminating barriers to intra-SAARC investments.109  
A primary concern for developing countries and LDCs is that being 
an agenda of capital-exporting countries, any such agreement promotes 
their own interests to the detriment of the host countries.110 However, 
SAFTA contracting parties are not capital-exporting countries, so this 
concern should not be an element in their sub-regional forums. 
Additionally, if any dispute arises relating to FDI from an investor of 
another SAFTA contracting party, it should be subject to SAFTA’s 
dispute settlement procedures. The contracting parties may formulate 
                                                           
106 See generally H. JEFFREY LEONARD, POLLUTION AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD 
PRODUCT: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS, ENVIRONMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE 
ADVANTAGE (1988) (arguing that the strictness of environmental regulations in developed countries 
such as the United States has incentivized many industries to relocate their operations to less 
developed countries with fewer regulations). 
107 See M. RAFIQUL ISLAM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW OF THE WTO 500 (2006). 
108 See generally United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2009, The Role of 
International Investment Agreements in Attracting Foreign Direct Investment to Developing 
Countries, art. III, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/5 (describing how preferential trade and 
investment agreements affect the flow of FDI into developing countries). 
109 SAFTA, supra note 2, art. 8(h). 
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rules on settling FDI-related disputes, limiting them to the investors 
within the sub-region.  
It may be argued that once an agreement is in place to protect sub-
regional investors, SAFTA contracting parties may be pressed by big 
businesses from third-party countries to extend similar treatment to them. 
However, that line of argument does not appear to be persuasive based 
on the abundance of agreement templates already in place for protecting 
FDI. Indeed, all but two SAFTA contracting parties are parties to at least 
one bilateral investment treaty.111 Afghanistan has signed bilateral 
investment treaties with three countries, Bangladesh with twenty-eight 
countries, India with seventy-eight countries, Nepal with four countries, 
Pakistan with forty-seven countries, and Sri Lanka with twenty-seven 
countries.112 Though only four of these bilateral investment treaties are 
between SAFTA contracting parties,113 the remaining bilateral 
investment treaties involve countries of varying economic power from 
LDCs to developed countries. More significantly, a study by the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development shows that in 2009 at 
least four SAFTA contracting parties114 were subjected to state versus 
investor dispute settlement claims.115 This implies that they may be 
willing to embrace a binding sub-regional investment mechanism 
providing for state versus investor dispute settlement. 
B. SAFTA Should Include an FDI Settlement Dispute Clause 
To ease concerns, promote confidence among investors, and avoid 
diplomatic tussle among SAFTA contracting parties, a SAFTA provision 
should be drafted whereby any individual investor from the sub-region 
can bring a claim against a contracting party in a sub-regional dispute 
settlement forum. The provision can be modeled after NAFTA’s Chapter 
11. Such a provision would help to de-politicize the process of dispute 
settlement and tone down any potential diplomatic rows that often 
                                                           
111 The two exceptions are Bhutan and the Maldives. See U.N. CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV. 
(UNCTAD), Country-specific Lists of BITs, June 1, 2010, 
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surface in state-versus-state dispute settlement.116 However, unlike the 
NAFTA model, SAFTA should not provide for ad hoc arbitration panels 
to settle investment disputes. Dispute settlements by ad hoc panels are 
fraught with the peril of breeding uncertain rulings. The ad hoc panels 
should be replaced with a permanent panel of arbiters that will specialize 
in investment disputes, thus giving more stability to the arbitration 
process. 
SAFTA contracting parties have signed the Agreement for 
Establishment of SAARC Arbitration Council (SAC Agreement) to set 
up an arbitration council (Council),117 but it is unclear whether, under 
this agreement, a third-party investor can directly bring a claim against a 
SAFTA member. The SAC Agreement is ambiguous and has yet to take 
force. It appears that the application of the SAC Agreement will be 
limited to the investors of the contracting parties, since the preamble 
notes that the contracting parties are “[d]esirous of creating conditions 
favourable for fostering greater investment by investors of one Member 
State in the territory of another Member State” (emphasis omitted).118  
However, there is nothing in the SAC Agreement to imply that non-
SAFTA investors would be able to invoke any of its provisions. The 
proposed Council, headed by the Director-General, is entrusted with the 
responsibility of maintaining a list of those who may act as arbitrators for 
settling investment disputes.119 The SAC Agreement in its current form 
does not contain any provision as to whether a foreign investor can 
directly bring a claim against a contracting party.  
 SAFTA is also unclear about whether a corporate entity can bring a 
claim against a SAFTA country. Because the details still need to be 
solidified, it is anticipated that strong opposition may be voiced by some 
domestic interest groups or courts against giving an investor the right to 
bring a claim against a member country, as that would mean that a 
corporate entity could bring a claim directly against a SAFTA 
contracting party. However, in the domestic legal setting, individuals and 
corporate actors can litigate against the government, and some of the 
contracting parties have provided for similar rights for foreign investors. 
Since this is not a novel idea, the state versus investor dispute settlement 
may not appear to be such an odd thing.  
                                                           
116 See Michael Ewing-Chow, Investor Protection in Free Trade Agreements: Lessons from 
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For example, Mexico agreed to a state versus state dispute settlement 
procedure. Mexico had a long-standing history of investment disputes 
with the United States and so it incorporated the Calvo Doctrine, 
essentially demanding that aliens engaged in commercial activities in the 
territory of another country rely on the rules of that country for all 
commercial matters and not involve their native country in espousing 
claims on behalf of its citizens.120 Nonetheless, neither the long history of 
disputes nor the dogmatic adherence to the Calvo Doctrine stood in the 
way of agreeing to a common set of investment rules in NAFTA. Rather, 
Mexico wanted to project itself as a secure destination for foreign 
investors.121 Likewise, SAFTA contracting parties, by establishing a state 
versus investor dispute settlement rule, may create a good impression 
that may counteract—albeit to a limited extent—the sub-region’s bad 
name for political upheavals.  
C. SAFTA Should Include a Competition Policy 
To ensure countries will benefit from free trade, SAFTA should 
include a competition policy to prevent the rise of anti-competitive 
practices. One of the basic objectives of trade liberalization is to increase 
the choices of goods and services and decrease consumer prices by 
increasing competition among businesses. However, the anti-competitive 
practices of businesses may nullify or circumscribe the benefits of free 
trade that consumers could otherwise enjoy.122 By engaging in 
monopolistic and oligopolistic practices, big businesses with 
disproportionate market share may abuse their market power and capture 
the benefits of trade liberalization—rather than the consumers who are 
the intended beneficiaries.123 Competition policies complement the trade 
liberalization’s objective of maintaining an efficient market that benefits 
consumers.  
Though the WTO has not been able to implement a competition 
policy, developing countries are likely to agree to competition rules in 
PTAs. The issue of incorporating a universal competition agreement in 
the WTO has been so divisive that the General Council made a decision 
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that no work towards negotiations on competition policies would occur 
within the WTO during the Doha Round Negotiations.124 Many 
developing countries in the WTO resist the formulation of multilateral 
competition rules at the WTO but take a markedly different stance when 
it comes to competition policies in PTAs. A recent survey of sixty-eight 
PTAs involving developing countries found that fifty of those 
agreements include a competition policy.125 This divergence in approach 
may partially be attributed to the fact that the focus of competition rules 
within the WTO framework focuses more on ensuring competitive 
market access (which favors business from developed countries that are 
operating in developing countries) than on the promotion of fair 
competition among all businesses.126 Moreover, the divergence in the 
economic size of the WTO member states makes it difficult to find 
common ground in competition matters. However, it may be surmised 
that SAFTA contracting parties will not have much difficulty 
incorporating a sub-regional competition policy framework. Indeed, the 
text of SAFTA expresses an aspiration for promoting competition within 
the SAARC area. 
One of the main objectives of SAFTA is “promoting conditions of 
fair competition in the free trade area….”127 However, the agreement 
includes no specific means for reaching this objective. A sub-regional 
competition policy framework could be the vehicle to ensure this aim is 
realized. Though it may not be feasible to immediately frame a supra-
national, sub-regional competition authority to regulate and enforce 
common competition policies formulated within SAARC, a sub-regional 
body could initially play an advisory role. In this capacity it could 
formulate a model competition framework for the contracting parties. 
Additionally, it could assist the contracting parties in investigating 
alleged cases of anti-competitive practices. A sub-regional competition 
policy framework would be compatible with the desire to increase trade 
among SAFTA contracting parties.  
D. SAARC Can Use SAFTA for Coalition Building in Global 
Trade Negotiations 
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Member countries can use SAFTA to promote their interests in 
global trade negotiations. The trade promotion initiative of a PTA is not 
necessarily limited to the confines of its parties’ internal trade. Recently, 
PTAs have been used to form coalitions for increasing the leverage of 
individual member countries in WTO negotiations.128 Even members of 
the European Commission, despite being advanced economies, have 
found it helpful to marshal their trade-negotiating resources and now 
conduct much of their WTO-related activities by the European 
Commission rather than by individual countries.129 When a group of 
WTO member states takes a concerted position on an issue that other 
WTO members do not agree with, it becomes difficult for the latter to 
outright reject the former’s voice.130 Thus, the other members may 
attenuate their position or give concessions in another area.131 A group’s 
collective position also improves its chances of representation in those 
issues where only a few of its parties negotiate. Hence, a coalition of 
SAFTA contracting parties in the WTO would likely be better positioned 
in negotiations than each country would be individually. As developing 
countries and LDCs, there are a number of areas where SAFTA 
contracting parties’ interests converge in WTO negotiations. Admittedly, 
SAFTA contracting parties compete in areas, like textiles, where they vie 
for access to third-party markets. However, SAFTA contracting parties 
must be careful not to allow the few areas of competing interests to 
undermine their cooperation in areas where their interests converge. 
SAFTA contracting parties have more or less a common stance on many 
issues, such as advocating for stronger protection of traditional 
knowledge, geographical indication on products,132 and the elimination 
of agricultural subsidies, as well as fighting for the prevention of new 
multilateral agreements on investment and competition within the WTO, 
linkage of trade and non-trade social issues like labor rights, and the 
involvement of non-governmental organizations in WTO procedures.133 
Additionally, as developing countries and LDCs, SAFTA contracting 
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parties are frequently subjected to excessive quarantines and 
environmental measures in the markets of developed economies. 
Proposed carbon tariffs to tackle climate change—as suggested by some 
from developed countries134—could potentially be an issue where all 
SAFTA contracting parties have a common stand. Because of their 
limited resources, it is likely that many industries of SAFTA contracting 
parties would have difficulty in changing production patterns. As 
exporters they would be disproportionately subjected to such carbon 
tariffs.  
There are other trade issues where the interests of the contracting 
parties may converge. One example is the proposed Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement that includes very stringent measures to punish 
infringement of intellectual property rights.135 While the infringement of 
intellectual property rights may be sanctioned by tougher international 
treaty rules, there are apprehensions among some analysts that this 
agreement may go too far.136 Of particular concern to them is the 
prospect that the proposed instrument may negatively impact the 
legitimate trade of generic drugs.137 As net-importers of intellectual 
property products, the contracting parties may take a common position 
against the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement.  
It is difficult for SAFTA countries—particularly the LDCs—to 
negotiate individually with developed countries. However, SAFTA 
contracting parties can collectively set up a sub-regional database of 
unjustified quarantines and environmental measures that their producers 
face in developed markets. South Asian industries can submit 
information to this database about the unjustified barriers they face in 
their export markets. Based on the analysis of the data collated, SAFTA 
contracting parties can negotiate with those economies that resort to 
using unjustified trade barriers. By acting as a single entity in this 
manner, it is probable that contracting parties would elicit better 
outcomes than acting individually. But in view of the modest collective 
clout of the contracting parties in global terms, even their allied stance 
                                                           
134 See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Fetishizing Free Trade, N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 2009, 
available at http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/09/11/fetishizing-free-trade/. 
135 See generally Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement – 
Summary of Key Elements under Discussion, http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-
sheets/2009/november/acta-summary-key-elements-under-discussion (last visited Oct. 26, 2010) 
(outlining the objective and structure of the Agreement).  
136 See, e.g., Charles R. McManis, The Proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
(ACTA): Two Tales of a Treaty, 46 Hous. L. Rev. 1235, 1256 (2009). 
137 See generally 3D, Switzerland: Missing Policy Coherence: Trade Interests Overriding Right 
to Health?, (Nov. 23-26, 2009), 
http://www.3dthree.org/pdf_3D/3D_CESCRSwitzerland_Nov2009.pdf (arguing, inter alia, that the 
adoption of strict intellectual property rules would impede the generic drug trade and thus negatively 
affect international health). 
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may not be enough to enable them to reach every outcome to which they 
might aspire. To achieve their desired goals, they may need to coordinate 
with other WTO members or groups with similar interests. But even in 
such cases, concerted action by SAFTA contracting parties is likely to 
make the coordination easier and more effective than isolated endeavors 
of individual contracting parties alone.  
To effectively negotiate as a group, SAFTA must establish a 
permanent body of recognized trade negotiation experts to devise 
common policies for WTO negotiations. If financial resources constrain 
the establishment of a permanent body, SAFTA may need to initially 
vest the current COE with this responsibility. However, the COE is a 
dispute-settlement body and should eventually be composed of 
independent arbiters. The responsibility of identifying issues of 
collective interest and drawing up common positions on those issues is 
essentially a diplomatic task. Therefore, persons with competence in 
diplomacy and negotiations should be sought. SAFTA should create a 
common fund that, over time, can bear the expense of establishing a 
permanent body to direct common policy coordination for the 
multilateral trade forum. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The South Asian Free Trade Agreement has tremendous potential to 
improve the economic and political welfare of its member countries. 
However, its effectiveness is currently weak due to bilateral PTAs, which 
bypass its authority, and because SAFTA’s under- and over-regulates 
important issues. By working together, member countries may overcome 
both of these obstacles and achieve SAFTA’s original goals. 
To make SAFTA a fully functioning agreement, contracting parties 
must first terminate existing bilateral PTAs among themselves. However, 
since these PTAs provide contracting parties with strong financial 
incentives, this step is implausible until (1) SAFTA is modified to 
provide the benefits that drove contracting parties to create bilateral 
PTAs, and (2) SAFTA is strengthened by changing its current terms that 
are either under- or over-regulative.  
One major benefit contracting parties would gain in making these 
changes would be the reduction in the administrative burden on custom 
authorities from the plethora of bilateral PTAs. Businesses would also 
benefit from doing business in a less complex trade regime. While some 
businesses may fear losing bilateral agreement benefits, their 
apprehension should be adequately addressed if SAFTA offers identical 
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market access benefits. Undeniably, some inefficient producers hitherto 
benefiting from bilateral PTAs might have to re-allocate their resources 
in view of the competition from other SAFTA producers. Nevertheless, 
that type of re-allocation of resources is the central point of any trade 
liberalization scheme. By eliminating bilateral PTAs between contracting 
parties, discrimination between SAFTA producers would be put to an 
end. Those businesses that are currently not enjoying benefits of bilateral 
PTAs should petition their governments to eliminate those treaties.  
To increase the movement of goods across borders it is critical that 
the contracting parties put in place an integrated transport network. Trade 
co-operation initiatives should not be limited to the confines of their sub-
regional forum; the sub-regional market—no matter how expansive and 
integrated—cannot be a substitute for the global market. The contracting 
parties would benefit from extending their collective resources to the 
negotiations of the WTO. A concerted SAFTA trade body would ensure 
better outcomes for the contracting parties than anything they could 
attain individually. Taking these vital steps will ensure that SAFTA is 
both internationally respected and economically effective. 
  
